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 Impacts of Privatization on Employment:
Evidence from China.
Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of privatization on ￿rm employment using a panel
dataset of 386 ￿rms in China in the period 1995-2001. Controlling ￿rm and year ￿xed
e￿ects, our panel regressions ￿nd that employment grows faster in privatized ￿rms than
in pure state-owned ￿rms by a margin of 17.7 percentage points over the base year of
1995. We also study the dynamic impact of privatization on employment growth and
￿nd that the performance of privatized ￿rms improves over time. These ￿ndings are
robust even after we control other performance and ￿nancial variables as well as the
pre-privatization employment history of privatized ￿rms. In addition, we employ the
di￿erence-in-di￿erence propensity score matching method to check the robustness of
our results. The estimates con￿rm the regression-based results.
JEL Classi￿cation: J23, L33, P311 Introduction
Privatization has been the most signi￿cant economic phenomenon in recent years in China.
Between 1995 and 2004, 50 percent of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were fully or par-
tially privatized (Garnaut, Song, Tenev, and Yao, 2005). China’s privatization program, if
fully carried out, may be the largest industrial ownership transformation ever undertaken,
a￿ecting more than 200,000 SOEs and 100 million urban workers (Wei, Varela, and Hassan,
2002).
Because of the large-scale employment in the SOEs, one concern about privatization
is the potential loss of employment and its negative impacts on social stability. In the
period 1995-2003, a total of 43.8 million people lost their jobs in the SOE sector (Garnaut
et al., 2005, Table 4.1). Privatization is easily picked up as the cause for this massive
reduction of employment. To the extent that there is high worker redundancy in the SOEs,
it seems legitimate to suspect that privatization inevitably leads to massive layo￿s. However,
several reasons render this suspicion dubious. First, China implemented massive structural
adjustment in its industrial sector in the mid-1990s, trimming o￿ excessive capacities in
industries that over-supplied their products (such as textile) and mining cities that ran
out of resources. This led to reduction of employment in the SOE sector. Second, facing
growing competition from private ￿rms, SOEs began to implement a policy called jianyuan
zengxiao (cutting the number of employees, improving e￿ciency) in the mid-1990s, resulting
in massive layo￿s. Privatized ￿rms may also reduce the size of employment, but there is
no a prior reason to believe that they would lay o￿ more workers than SOEs did. This is
related to our last reason concerning the e￿ciency gains of privatization. Evidence shows
that privatization has led to signi￿cant improvements in ￿rm e￿ciency (Sun and Tong, 2003;
Xu, Zhu, and Lin, 2005; Garnaut, Song, and Yao, 2006). To the extent that e￿ciency leads
1to ￿rm expansion, it is reasonable to believe that privatized ￿rms would maintain a lower
reduction rate of employment.
Existing empirical studies on other transition countries provide mixed results regarding
privatization’s impact on employment. Using multi-country samples, Galal, Jones, Tandon
and Vogelsang (1994), Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994), and Boubakri and Cosset
(1998) all ￿nd that employment increases after privatization, but D’Souza and Megginson
(1999) come to the opposite conclusion. 1 So far, there are few studies on the impact of
privatization on employment in China. D’Souza, Hassan, Varela and Wei (2003) study 208
listed ￿rms for the period 1990-1997 and ￿nd no signi￿cant change in employment shortly
after the listing, but their employment declines signi￿cantly in the long run. But this study
just uses the Wilcoxon signed rank test (z-statistic) to test the signi￿cance of the mean
change.
Our paper aims at providing more accurate and more general estimates for the causal
e￿ect of privatization on employment in China. We use a unique panel dataset of 386 ￿rms
for the period 1995-2001. This panel dataset enables us to handle the selection problem that
plagues most studies of privatization (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). To assess the impact
of privatization on employment, we need to make inferences about employment that would
have been observed for privatized ￿rms had they not been privatized. However, privatized
￿rms might be selected on the basis of employment; for example, it is possible that ￿rms
with a stronger potential of growth are more likely to be privatized (Guo and Yao, 2005).
This is because politicians are concerned with unemployment and incline to retain ￿rms
with the worst prospects in state ownership to prevent possible layo￿s. Overlooking such
selection problems could lead to biases when we estimate the impact of privatization on
employment. The panel structure of our data enables us to use the ￿xed-e￿ect model to
1D’Souza and Megginson (1999) have one Chinese ￿rm in their sample.
2eliminate selection bias due to time invariant unobservables. In the absence of a genuinely
randomized experiment, the ￿xed-e￿ect panel estimation is a nearly ideal tool to take care
the selection problem of privatization.
In addition to the ￿xed-e￿ect model, we also estimate the impact of privatization on
employment by the di￿erence-in-di￿erence propensity score matching (DID PSM) method.
Although applying a ￿xed-e￿ect model could largely reduce selection biases due to time-
invariant and ￿rm-invariant unobservables, DID PSM method has two advantages over it.
First, we do not need to impose the assumption of linear functional form in the DID PSM
method as we do in the ￿xed-e￿ect model. When functional form restrictions cannot be
justi￿ed by economic theories or the data generating process, DID PSM can lead to more
accurate estimates (Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2000). Second, DID PSM
reweighs the observations according to a pre-determined weighting function over the common
support, while ￿xed-e￿ect estimations rely on functional form to extrapolate outside the
common support. When there is poor overlapping in the support between privatized and non-
privatized ￿rms, this raises questions on the robustness of the methods relying on functional
forms to extrapolate outside the common support (Bryson, Dorsett, and Purdon, 2002).
Our descriptive analysis shows that both SOEs and privatized ￿rms reduced their
employment in our sample period. However, our econometric studies show that privatization
leads to signi￿cantly less reduction of employment. The simple ￿xed-e￿ect estimate shows
that the overall bene￿t of privatization is to increase employment growth over the base year
of 1995 by 17.7 percentage points. This e￿ect decreases to 11.5 percentage points when
we control ￿rms’ attributes of ￿nance and performance, suggesting that part of the e￿ect
of privatization is substantiated through improving the ￿rm’s ￿nancial and performance
parameters.
3We also study the dynamics of the impact of privatization over time using both the
￿xed-e￿ect panel method and the DID PSM method. The ￿xed-e￿ect panel estimates show
that privatization has a signi￿cantly positive e￿ect on employment in the ￿rst 6 years after
privatization. The DID PSM estimates are smaller than the ￿xed-e￿ect estimates, but they
follow the same pattern of dynamics.
We conduct a robustness test to the alternative interpretation that privatized ￿rms lay
o￿ workers before privatization so they do not need to do layo￿s after privatization. This
amounts to adding in the panel regressions pre-privatization year dummies for the privatized
￿rms. The results show that although privatized ￿rms do perform better than pure SOEs
even before they are privatized, the gap enlarges signi￿cantly after privatization. So our
results are robust.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and present
descriptive evidence. Section 3 discusses our methods of estimations. Sections 4 and 5
report the empirical results of the ￿xed-e￿ect and DID PSM estimation, respectively. Section
6 presents the results of the robustness test on the ￿xed-e￿ect results. Conclusions are
summarized in Section 7.
2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
2.1 Data
The data we use are taken from the\2002 Comprehensive Survey of SOE Reform in China",
which was jointly carried out by the then State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC),
PRC and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2002. The original sample contains
683 ￿rms that are located in 11 cities, which are, from north to south, Harbin (120 ￿rms),
Fushun (11 ￿rms), Tangshan (59 ￿ms), Xining (26 ￿rms), Lanzhou (39 ￿rms), Weifang (30
￿rms), Chengdu (44 ￿rms), Guiyang (149 ￿rms), Huangshi (79 ￿rms), Zhenjiang (69 ￿rms),
4and Hengyang (57 ￿rms). Some of these cities are large provincial capitals, and others are
medium-size cities. Detailed information about these cities and survey implementation can
be found in Garnaut et al. (2005). Firms were sampled from the SOEs managed by each city
as of the end of 1995. The year 1995 was chosen because large-scale privatization started in
1996. Data were recorded for the period 1995-2001.
A problem of the survey is concerned with the selection biases in the sampling process.
There were two potential sources of bias. One was the self-selection of the ￿rms in returning
the questionnaire, and the other was the selection of the city branches of the SETC, the
local counterparts that implemented the survey. The ￿rst source is unavoidable in any
survey based on voluntary participation, but hopefully the selection was not systematically
related to the decision of privatization. However, the second source may bring real concerns
as local o￿cials might press the ￿rms that had closer ties with the government, usually
the larger ones and non-privatized SOEs, to ￿ll the questionnaire. This would cause over-
sampling of non-privatized SOEs. We have the number of ￿rms that were fully owned by
the government or controlled by the government with majority shares in each city in each
year, so weighted regressions can be adopted to correct this bias. To accommodate di￿erent
methods of regression, however, we have adopted a di￿erent strategy to resample the SOEs
in each city by the following method.
Let Sit be the ratio of SOEs to privatized ￿rms in city i and year t, and let ^ Sit be the
corresponding ratio in our sample. Our aim is to preserve all the privatized SOEs in the
new sample. So for the sample of city i in year t, we de￿ne a weight for SOEs !it = Sit=^ Sit,
which can bring the ratio of SOEs to privatized ￿rms in the new sample to that of the city
in the same year when it is used to resample the SOEs. To keep the panel structure of the
data, however, we de￿ne a weighted weight for each city,
P2001
t=1995 !it(Nit=Ni), in which Nit is
5the number of SOEs of city i and year t in the sample, and Ni is the sum of Nit from 1995
to 2001. We then use this weighted weight to resample the SOEs of each city in year 2001.
We keep the cases of those sampled SOEs of each year in the new sample and drop the cases
of the other SOEs. Combining the selected SOEs with the privatized ￿rms, we get a new
sample of 386 ￿rms. The distribution of these ￿rms is: Harbin (71 ￿rms), Fushun (6 ￿rms),
Tangshan (35 ￿ms), Xining (19 ￿rms), Lanzhou (13 ￿rms), Chengdu (11 ￿rms), Guiyang
(52 ￿rms), Weifang (27 ￿rms), Huangshi (52 ￿rms), Zhenjiang (45 ￿rms), and Hengyang (55
￿rms).
2.2 Descriptive Evidence
We follow Estrin and Rosevers (1999) to de￿ne privatization as the introduction of private
shares into an SOE. That is, a ￿rm is regarded as privatized as long as it has any amount
of private shares. Evidence shows that ￿rm performance improves as the amount of private
shares increases (Garnaut et al., 2006), so using this de￿nition of privatization will obtain
the lower bound of the e￿ect of privatization on employment. Figure 1 shows the trend of
privatization in the new sample. The earliest privatization happened in 1996 in the sample.
The year 1998 was the turning point of accelerated privatization. The left vertical axis
represents the average private shares of the new sample, and the average private shares
increased steadily over the sample period reaching one fourth on average by 2001. The right
vertical axis represents SOE ratio of the new sample. By the end of 2001, 154 ￿rms, or 39.9
percent of the new sample, were privatizedand the SOE ratio decreased to 60.1 percent. The
speed of privatization matched the national average shown in Garnaut et al. (2005).
[Figure 1 about here]
6We use the number of on-duty workers to measure a ￿rm’s real employment. Over-
employment was a major problem for SOEs in the 1990s and was caused by two factors.
One, as Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) theorize in a general setting, local politicians
used employment to gather political supports. The other was that the performance of SOEs
deteriorated rapidly from the early 1990’s onwards (Huang and Meng, 1997; Perkins, 1996),
which led to overcapacity in SOEs. This forced SOEs to downsize. Jian yuan zeng xiao thus
became prevalent in the 1990s. However, the fear of social instability prevented ￿rms from
laying o￿ workers in the outright manner. Instead, two measures were created to mitigate
the impacts. One was xiagang, which means that a worker does not work for a factory but
still retains a nominal employment status with it and gets partially paid with a subsistence
wage. The other measure was internal retirement by which a worker gets retired but still
remains as an employee of the factory. As a result, there was a large discrepancy between
real employment and nominal employment, especially for pure SOEs. Therefore, using the
number of on-duty employees is a more appropriate measure for employment.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 compares the employment performance of pure SOEs and privatized ￿rms over
time. It is clear in the ￿gure that privatized ￿rms outperformed pure SOEs. The employment
size of pure SOEs declined constantly throughout the survey period, trimming down from
an average of 700 on-duty workers in 1995 to only 400 in 2001. Privatized ￿rms maintained
larger employment than pure SOEs throughout the sample period. This di￿erence might be
caused by privatization’s selection of larger ￿rms, so it is more interesting study the growth
rates of the two kinds of ￿rms. Between 1995 and 1997, the average size of privatized ￿rms
increased. After 1997, they joined in the rank of pure SOEs to reduce their employment,
but at a slower pace. The average reduction rate of pure SOEs in the period 1995-2001 was
77.2 percent per annum, but it was 3.8 percent per annum for privatized ￿rms in the period
1997-2001.
3 Econometric Strategies
In assessing the impact of privatization on employment, we need to make inferences about
the counterfactual outcomes that could have been observed for privatized ￿rms had they not
been privatized. Without a random experiment, no direct estimate of such counterfactual
outcomes is available. In this paper, we rely on two econometric techniques to obtain nearly
ideal estimates. One is the ￿xed-e￿ect panel model and the other is the DID PSM method.
Both methods are e￿ective in controlling the selection biases arising from time-invariant
factors. In addition, the second does not rely on the linear functional form and handles the
control group in a more precise manner. The results of the two methods can be compared
to discover the more robust outcomes.
As we showed in the last section, the level of employment is not a good dependent
variable to study as the selection of privatization may be correlated with it. Studying
employment growth rates is a more sensible approach. However, annual growth rates are
volatile and may contain many noises that cannot be properly captured by observed variables.
As an alternative, we study the ￿xed-base growth rate of employment using 1995 as the base
year. Speci￿cally, the employment growth rate of ￿rm i in year t is the percentage increase
of its number of on-duty workers between 1995 and year t. 2
2the growth rate of 1995 is naturally set to zero.
83.1 Fixed-e￿ect Model
Taking advantage of our panel data, we will estimate the following model with ￿rm and year
￿xed e￿ects:
Yit = Xit￿1￿ + Pit￿ + ￿i + It + ￿it; (1)
where Yit is the ￿xed base growth rate of employment of ￿rm i in year t (t = 1996;1997;￿￿￿;2001),
Xit￿1 is a set of variables representing ￿rm performance and ￿nance (lagged by one year)
that might be correlated with both the growth rate of employment and privatization, Pit is
the privatization dummy variable that is equal to 1 if ￿rm i had nonzero private share in
year t and equal to 0 if it had zero private share, ￿i is the ￿rm ￿xed e￿ect for ￿rm i, and
It is the year ￿xed e￿ect for year t. The control variables enter with their lagged values to
avoid their contemporaneous correlations with the dependent variable. As a result, the time
span for the dependent variable is from 1996 to 2001. The ￿rm ￿xed e￿ects control the kind
of time-invariant ￿rm quality that is correlated with both ownership and employment but is
unobserved in our data. They extract time-invariant correlations between the explanatory
variables and the error term. The year ￿xed e￿ects control time-speci￿c factors that were
correlated with both employment and privatization and common to all ￿rms. These could
include changes in macroeconomic conditions as well as government policies that a￿ected
both employment and the pace of privatization. The residual ￿it includes the e￿ects of mea-
surement and speci￿cation errors. Our identifying assumption is that these components are
uncorrelated with ￿rm ownership. The coe￿cient of our interest is ￿, the mean di￿erence in
employment growth between privatized ￿rms and pure SOEs.
With the set of control variables Xit￿1 included, equation (1) is estimating the direct
e￿ect of privatization. The e￿ects of privatization can be categorized into two sets. One set
includes those that can be captured by improved pro￿tability and ￿nancial positions. Priva-
9tization could lead to better performance and adjustments to a ￿rm’s ￿nancial conditions,
which in turn could lead to more employment. In particular, two practices in privatization
are important for a privatized ￿rm to improve its ￿nancial conditions. One is debt evasion,
and the other is discounts of privatization prices. It has been found that some privatized
￿rms set up a new identity to move productive assets into it and leave debts in the old ￿rm
(Garnaut et al., 2005). To exchange for privatized ￿rms’ consent to retain more workers, lo-
cal governments are found to give them discounts in privatization prices, including removing
part or all of their debts to a government-owned dummy company (Garnaut et al., 2005).
With these two practices, the ￿nancial conditions of privatized ￿rms are automatically im-
proved and employment could go up. We call this kind of improvement the indirect e￿ect
of privatization. The other set of e￿ects is related to those that are not captured by the
current pro￿tability and ￿nancial performance, but rather linked to the expectation for fu-
ture performance. These include improved ￿rm management skills and incentives, changed
product lines, new R&D, and other improvements whose positive e￿ects take time to show
up. This set of e￿ects is what we meant by the direct e￿ect. The coe￿cient of the priva-
tization dummy in equation (1) measures this e￿ect as the equation controls the indirect
e￿ect through the control variables. In addition to estimating the direct e￿ect, however, we
are also interested in the total e￿ect of privatization, which is the sum of the direct and
indirect e￿ects. To estimate it, it su￿ces to drop the control variables Xit￿1 and to estimate
equation (1) again.
We also want to investigate the dynamic e￿ects of privatization. This amounts to split-
ting the privatization dummy in equation (1) into a set of post-privatization year dummies:
priv0it (for the year of privatization), priv1it (for the ￿rst year after privatization), ￿￿￿, and
priv5it (for the ￿fth year after privatization). 3 Naturally, the sum of these six dummies is
3The ￿rst year of privatization in our sample is 1996, so the maximum number of post-privatization years




where ￿0 measures the average e￿ect of privatization for the year of privatization, ￿ 1 the
average e￿ect for the ￿rst year after privatization, etc. This model will help us get a sense
on the speed with which the estimated e￿ect occurs: Is the e￿ect immediate or gradual? Is
it only temporary, or permanent? Like in the case of estimating the average e￿ect, we will
also drop the control variables Xit￿1 and estimate (2) again to obtain the total e￿ects of
privatization.
3.2 DID PSM Estimation
The treatment group in our PSM estimation is de￿ned as the ￿rm-year observations of
privatized ￿rms after they were privatized, and the control group is de￿ned as the ￿rm-year
observations of ￿rms that had not been privatized till the end of 2001. Thus de￿ned, there
are 154 observations in the treatment group and 1392 observations in the control group. One
problem arising from this de￿nition is that one needs to worry about the ￿rm speci￿c e￿ects
in the estimation of the propensity scores. For that, we estimate the following random-e￿ect
logit model: 4
Pit = Zit￿1 + vi + eit; (3)
where Pit is de￿ned as in equation (1), Zit￿1 is a set of variables that predict the probability
of privatization, vi is the random e￿ect of ￿rm i, and eit is an i.i.d error term. Because
privatization is a nonreversible process, we only include the cases of the privatization year
is 5.
4Our panel is relatively short so a ￿xed-e￿ect logit model cannot be consistently estimated.
11for the privatized ￿rms. The propensity score for each observation is then estimated by
assuming that Evi = 0.
[Table 1 about here]
Following Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1997, 1998), we adopt the di￿erence-
in-di￿erence (DID) estimator to estimate the e￿ects of privatization and use the kernel-
weighted weights in the matching. The estimation is a bit tricky because privatization
happened in di￿erent years. One way is to estimate the dynamic e￿ects of privatization that
equation (2) tries to estimate. Table 1 illustrates the way that observations are matched
and the e￿ects are estimated. In the table, T0 is the calendar year before treatment (i.e.,
privatization), and T1 is the calendar year after treatment. For the treatment group, T0
is always the year before privatization. It varies from ￿rm to ￿rm because privatization
happened in di￿erent years. T1 then is the order of year after privatization for which the
e￿ect is estimated. For the control group, T0 is any year between 1995 and 2000, and T1 is
T0 + k + 1 as long as it does not exceed 2001, where k is the order of year for which the
e￿ect of privatization is estimated. Then the DID PSM estimator for the e￿ect of the kth






[(Yk1i ￿ Y0i) ￿
NPk X
j=1
Wij(Yk1j ￿ Yk0j)]; (4)
In the equation, Pk is the number of observations that remain in the treatment group for
the kth (k = 0;1;2;￿￿￿;5) year after privatization, NPk is the corresponding number of
observations that remain in the control group; Y0i is the employment growth rate of the
ith ￿rm of the treatment group in the year before it was privatized, Yk1i is its employment
growth rate in the kth year after privatization, Y 0
k0j and Y 0
k1j are the employment growth
rates of the jth ￿rm of the control group with interval of k + 1 years; and lastly, Wij is the
12kernel-weighted weight of the jth ￿rm in the control group relative to the ith ￿rm in the
treatment group. 5 Thus de￿ned, the DID PSM estimator hat￿k is in fact the average e￿ect
of the kth year after privatization based on the performance of ￿rms privatized in di￿erent
years.
4 Results of the Fixed-e￿ect Model
In this section, we report the estimated impact of privatization on employment using ￿xed-
e￿ect model. We start with the basic results from the estimation of the average privatization
e￿ect ￿. Next we report our estimates of the dynamics for ￿ve years after the privatization.
4.1 Control Variables
Before presenting the econometric results, we provide a short description of the control
variables. These variables can be divided into four groups. The ￿rst is concerned with a
￿rm’s performance, the second its employment conditions, the third its ￿nancial conditions,
and the fourth industry and city characteristics. In the ￿rst group, we have included ￿rm
pro￿tability (before-tax pro￿t divided by the gross value of assets), 6 labor productivity
(sales revenue divided by the number of on-duty workers, in 2001 yuan using the CPI as the
de￿ator), unit cost (material costs divided by sales revenue), investment rate (new investment
divided by the gross value of assets), and the amount of outside state shares. Naturally, we
expect that ￿rms with higher rate of pro￿tability, higher labor productivity, lower unit
cost, and higher investment rate would achieve higher employment growth. The variable of
outside state shares is included because it is found that outside state shares improve ￿rm
performance either by bringing in capital or by changing the incentive schemes in the ￿rm
(Song and Yao, 2006).
5The formula for Wij can be found in Heckman et al. (1998).
6We use the gross value of assets, not the net value, because many ￿rms had negative net values.
13In the second group of control variables, we have included three variables: average
wage (total wage payroll divided by the number of on-duty workers, in 2001 yuan using the
producer price index as the de￿ator), 7 redundancy rate (the total number of textitxiagang
workers, internally retired workers, and o￿cially retired workers divided by the number of
on-duty workers), 8 and capital per-worker (the gross value of assets divided by the number
of on-duty workers, in 2001 yuan using the producer price index as the de￿ator). 9 It is
natural to expect that higher average wage (higher labor cost) and redundancy rate reduce
employment growth rate. In addition, capital per-worker captures the \weight" of a ￿rm.
Many SOEs are \over-weighted" in the sense that they have adopted too capital-intensive
technologies, which prevents them from absorbing more workers. So we expect that more
capital per-worker retards employment growth.
The third group of control variables also includes three variables: debts/assets ratio
(the amount of commercial and bank debts divided by the gross value of assets), bank dues
(the amount of new overdue bank loans and interests divided by the gross value of assets), and
tax dues (new overdue taxes divided by the gross value of assets). The debts/assets ratio
re￿ects a ￿rm’s general ￿nancial conditions, and bank dues and tax dues re￿ect a ￿rm’s
budget constraint with respect to bank borrowing and its relationship with the government.
Soft budget constraints with the bank and the government are results of bad performance.
It is then natural to expect that worsening ￿nancial conditions represented by the three
variables would result in slower employment growth.
7This de￿nition exaggerates the average wage paid to on-duty workers as ￿rms also pay their textitxi-
agang and internally retired workers. On the other hand, using the average wage paid to all the workers
underestimates the average wage paid to on-duty workers. Since worker redundancy is high (Figure 2), our
calculation of the average wage is a sensible way to characterize the labor cost of on-duty workers.
8O￿cially retired workers are counted as redundant workers as in many cases they are not covered by the
public retirement scheme and still paid by their factories. This is especially true for ￿rms in the privatization
process. See Garnaut et al. (2005) for detailed discussion.
9Our survey did not record the value of ￿xed capital, so here we use the gross value of assets. The
correlation between these two values is high as ￿xed capital is the largest component of assets in most ￿rms.
14The last group of control variables is a set of industrial and city dummies that aim at
controlling industrial and city speci￿c e￿ects. They do not appear in the ￿xed-e￿ect panel
estimation for obvious reasons but appear in the logit model for PS matching. Although the
industrial coverage of the sample ￿rms is large, the number of ￿rms in each industry would
be small if we use the two-digit industries to classify the sample ￿rms. Instead, we group
the sample ￿rms into 10 industries.
[Table 2 about here]
Summary statistics of the control variables as well as the dependent variable and the
privatization dummies are presented in the ￿rst panel of Table 2. The table also makes
a comparison between privatized ￿rms and pure SOEs. On average, privatized ￿rms out-
performed pure SOEs in pro￿tability, labor productivity, and unit cost, and also had more
outside state shares. However, privatized ￿rms had lower investment rate than pure SOEs.
In terms of employment conditions, privatized ￿rms were much "lighter", had a smaller re-
dundancy rate, but paid a higher wage than pure SOEs. The Chinese labor market is not
fully competitive so wage may be correlated with ￿rm performance. We will keep this in
mind when we interpret our empirical results. Lastly, privatized ￿rms performed much better
than pure SOEs in terms of debts and bank dues. In contrast, they had more overdue taxes
than pure SOEs. It seems that privatization has hardened ￿rms’ budget constraints with
respect to bank borrowing and commercial deals, but has done nothing or even worsened
￿rms’ budget constraint with respect to the government.
4.2 Average E￿ect of Privatization on Employment
The estimation results of equation (1) are presented in the ￿rst two columns of Table 3. The
t-statistics are calculated using the robust standard errors. Column 1 presents the results
15for the total e￿ect of privatization. It is shown that on average, privatization increases the
number of on-duty workers by 17.65 percent over the base year of 1995, with a t-statistic 6.53.
This is a very large e￿ect because it is equivalent to 41 percent of the rate of employment
reduction in pure SOEs in the period 1995-2001. Column 2 presents the results for the
direct e￿ect of privatization. The direct e￿ect is 11.49 percent, which is smaller than the
total e￿ect, but remains signi￿cant. This means that privatization does have an indirect
e￿ect on employment through improvements made to a ￿rm’s performance and ￿nancial
conditions.
[Table 3 about here]
Among the performance variables, pro￿tability and outside state shares increase em-
ployment growth. However, both e￿ects are not very large: one percentage increase of them
increases employment by 0.17 percent and 0.15 percent, respectively, both over the 1995
level. Nevertheless, the positive e￿ect of outside state shares still calls for attention. One
possible reason is that outside SOEs are more capable than private owners to bring in capital
to the ￿rm because SOEs are favored by banks in making loans. However, more research
is needed to ￿nd out the exact reason behind this result. The paradoxical result is that
labor productivity has a negative coe￿cient that is marginally signi￿cant at the 10 percent
signi￿cance level. However, it may be a spurious result arising from the de￿nition of labor
productivity which is revenue per on-duty worker. Lastly, investment rate and unit cost are
not signi￿cant.
As for the variables representing employment conditions, average wage and per-worker
capital signi￿cantly reduce employment although neither e￿ect is economically strong. Worker
redundancy is not found to have a signi￿cant e￿ect on employment growth.
16A higher debts/assets ratio slows down employment growth. But again, the e￿ect is
not economically strong as one percentage increase of the ratio only brings down employment
growth by 0.03 percentage points. The two variables for soft-budget constraints with the
bank and the government are highly insigni￿cant, though.
4.3 Dynamic Impacts of Privatization
We turn next to the dynamic e￿ects of privatization. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 we
report the estimated results for the total and direct dynamic e￿ects of privatization, respec-
tively. Among the control variables, pro￿tability, per-worker capital, and debts/assets ratio
have kept their signs and remained signi￿cant while labor productivity, outside state shares,
and average wage have turned insigni￿cant. All the other control variables have remained
insigni￿cant. The total e￿ects of privatization are strong as all the six privatization dummies
in column 3 are highly signi￿cant and their coe￿cients are economically strong. Compared
with an SOE of the same size in 1995, an average privatized ￿rm has an employment size
14.2 percent larger in the year when privatization happens. The e￿ect increases as time
passes and peaks at 27.3 percent in the 4th year after privatization happens. It declines to
23.5 percent in the 5th year, though. The direct e￿ects shown in Column 4 follow the same
pattern as that of the total e￿ects, albeit all with slightly smaller magnitudes. These results
indicate that the positive e￿ects of privatization on employment are not only immediate,
but also persist for a reasonably long time period.
5 DID PSM Estimations
The crucial step in using PSM is estimating the propensity score. Hence, the underlining
principle to choose a suitable speci￿cation of the participation equation is that variables
that in￿uence simultaneously the participation decision and outcome should be included
17(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997). It should also be clear that only pre-intervention
variables that are not in￿uenced by privatization should be included in the regression (Jalan
and Ravallion, 2003). The existing literature shows that ￿rm performance, employment
conditions, and ￿nancial positions all in￿uence the privatization decision (Su and Je￿erson,
2003; Brandt et al. 2005; and Guo and Yao, 2005). This leads us to include all the con-
trol variables of the ￿xed-e￿ect model in the logit estimation of privatization. As before,
these variables enter the regression with their one-year lagged values. In addition, we have
included city, industrial and year dummy variables to control unobserved city and industrial
characteristics as well as changes of government policy over time. To satisfy the balance
test, we have included squares of some variables following Smith and Todd (2005).
As being discussed before, we only include in the treatment group the ￿rm-year ob-
servations of privatized ￿rms in the year when they were privatized. In the meantime, all
the ￿rm-year observations of ￿rms that remained as pure SOEs as of 2002 are in the control
group. This leaves us with a sample of 1500 ￿rms in which 154 are in the treatment group
and the rest in the control group. As being indicated before, random e￿ect model is used in
the logit estimation.
[Table 4 about here]
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 4. Although signi￿cant estimates are
scant, the model provides relatively good prediction rates. Prediction rates are emphasized
by Heckman and Smith (1999) and HIST (1998) as a check for the quality of the speci￿cation
to separate the treated and control groups. A common practice to assess correct predictions
is to use the fraction of the treated subjects in the total number of observations as the
cuto￿ value for the predicted probability. This cuto￿ value for our sample is 0.103. Using
this value, we ￿nd that the prediction rates for the treatment and control groups are 76.2
18percent and 74.7 percent, respectively. So it turns out that our propensity model is a good
predictor of participation.
For the PSM to be valid to match the treatment and control groups, we need to make
sure that our estimation satis￿es the CIA and common support conditions. We use the
balancing test proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to examine whether the propensity
model has been adequately speci￿ed to balance the covariates included in the speci￿cation.
There are several approaches to carry out such test, and the basic idea of them is to compare
the situation before and after matching and check if there remain any di￿erences after
conditioning on propensity scores. If there are di￿erences, it then suggests that either the
model is mis-speci￿ed or there is a failure of the CIA (Smith and Todd, 2005). In our paper,
we follow Sianesi(2004) to do the balance test by comparing the pseudo- R2’s before and
after matching. We ￿nd that before matching the pseudo- R2 is 0.234 and after matching
it is 0.025. 10 That is, conditional on the propensity score, the variables included in the
regression can not provide new information about the treatment decision.
The mean propensity score for the privatized ￿rms is 0.418 (with a standard deviation
of 0.360) while the mean score for pure SOEs is 0.086 (with a standard deviation of 0.158).
Figure 3 plots the histograms of the estimated propensity scores for privatized ￿rms and pure
SOEs to check the common support condition. There are regions where the two histograms
do not overlap. We thus exclude the privatized ￿rms in the non-overlapped region in our
matching exercise, and there are 17 such privatized ￿rms.
[Figure 3 about here]
Table 5 presents the DID PSM estimates for the dynamic e￿ects of privatization based
on equation (5). These estimates are all statistically signi￿cant except the one for the year
10We re-estimate the propensity score on the matched sample, that is only on pure SOEs and matched
privatized ￿rms, and get the pseudo-R2 after matching.
19of privatization. However, their magnitudes are considerably smaller than either the total
or the direct e￿ects produced by the ￿xed-e￿ect panel estimation. Nevertheless, they follow
the same time pattern as the ￿xed-e￿ect results, that is, the e￿ect of privatization increases
and peaks in the 4th year after privatization, but begins to decrease in the 5th year after
privatization. In addition, the PSM e￿ects are still very strong. By the 4th year after
privatization, the ￿xed-based employment growth rate of privatized ￿rms is higher than
that of pure SOEs by 19.6 percentage points.
[Table 5 about here]
6 Robustness Test
There is a possibility that privatized ￿rms laid o￿ more workers than pure SOEs before
they were privatized so they do not need to lay o￿ workers after privatization. In other
words, there is a moral hazard problem. Layo￿ is costly for ￿rms as they need to make
compensations to laid-o￿ workers (Garnaut et al., 2005). If he anticipated that the ￿rm
would be soon privatized and he would be the new owner, the ￿rm manager would lay
o￿ workers before privatization to save the compensations that he had to pay out of his
own pocket after privatization. If such argument is true, this raises the problem that the
e￿ects of privatization are exaggerated by both our ￿xed-e￿ect panel model and the PSM
estimation. To handle this problem, we perform a robustness test by adding in equation
(2) dummies of pre-privatization years for the privatized ￿rms. If privatized ￿rms laid o￿
workers quicker than pure SOEs before privatization happened, the estimates for the pre-
privatization dummies should be signi￿cantly negative. Notice that the sum of the pre-
and post- privatization dummies equals exactly the ￿rm dummy for privatized ￿rms, so the
￿xed-e￿ect estimation cannot be carried out. Instead, we estimate equation (2) by the OLS
20technique.
[Figure 4 about here]
Both the total and direct e￿ects of privatization are estimated. Instead of presenting the
full set of results of the two regressions, though, we graph the estimates for the privatization
dummies in Figure 4. The horizontal axis is the number of years relative to the privatization
year, and the vertical axis is the estimated e￿ect. Our data allow us to have 5 years each
before and after privatization. The graph shows that both the total and the direct e￿ects
are always positive and increase along the horizontal axis. The estimates of the total e￿ects
are all statistically signi￿cant except for the 4th and 5th year before privatization. As for
the direct e￿ects, all but the estimates of the 2nd and 3rd years before privatization and
the 4th and 5th years after privatization are signi￿cant. These results show that the moral
hazard problem does not exist in privatized ￿rms’ decision of employment before privatization
happens.
However, the results shown in Figure 4 may re￿ect a selection bias in privatization,
that is, ￿rms with a better prosperity of employment growth are privatized ￿rst. While our
earlier ￿xed-e￿ect and PSM estimations have reasonably controlled this problem, we further
notice that there is an immediate jump of performance after privatization in Figure 4, which
suggests that something more than selection biases is at work and that privatization has a
real impact on employment.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have empirically examined the impact of privatization on ￿rms’ employment
in China by employing a unique set of survey data. The ￿xed-e￿ect panel model shows that
privatization on average raises the ￿xed-base employment growth rate by 17.7 percentage
21points. The contribution of privatization remains at 11.5 percentage points even when ￿rm
performance, employment conditions, and ￿nancial positions are controlled for. We further
￿nd that privatization has long-lasting e￿ects on employment growth after privatization.
We also use the DID PSM method to relax the assumption of linear functional form used
in the ￿xed-e￿ect model and reweigh the observations over the common support. Its results
reinforce the ￿xed-e￿ect results. Our robustness test refuses the moral hazard hypothesis
that privatized ￿rms lay o￿ more workers than pure SOEs before privatization happens. So
the e￿ects that we have found are not outcomes of ￿rms’ strategic moves, but are the real
impacts of privatization.
These results possess strong implications for the policy debate in China regarding the
role of privatization in massive unemployment. Both old and privatized SOEs were losing
employment in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but our results show that privatized SOEs
maintained a signi￿cantly smaller reduction rate than pure SOEs. It is therefore wrong to
accuse privatization of causing China’s massive unemployment.
Then, what are the reasons for privatized ￿rms’ better performance? We believe that
two factors are at work here. The ￿rst is that privatization improves ￿rm pro￿tability,
￿nancial stance, and employment conditions, so ￿rms are able to retain more workers. This
factor may be weakened by the fact that privatized ￿rms get favorable treatments from the
bank and the government so their ￿nancial conditions are improved automatically (Garnaut
et al., 2005), but there is also evidence for true e￿ciency improvements (e.g., Garnaut et al.,
2006). The second factor is related to the expectation of the management. The fact that
he buys the ￿rm shows that the new owner of the ￿rm, no matter he is the old manager
or an outside investor, has a faith in the ￿rm’s future. This optimism can lead to a higher
employment rate. In addition, the new owner may introduce technological and managerial
22changes to the ￿rm, but the e￿ects of these changes take time to show up and cannot be
adequately accounted for by current ￿rm attributes. Our estimate of the direct e￿ect of
privatization captures this kind of expectation-related e￿ects.
One remaining question is how one explains the massive unemployment in China in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although the exact causes need careful analysis to ￿nd
out, here we provide two tentative explanations. First, it was a result of the structural
adjustment in the SOE sector. This included closing down unviable ￿rms (especially those
in the resource industries) and cutting the overcapacities in certain industries (noticeably the
textile industry). A case at point is Fushun, a sample city in this study. It was a mining city
that ran out of coal in the mid-1990s. The adjustment was a painful process for the city and
its unemployment rate reached 40 pecent in 2001. However, the privatization rate in Fushun
was among the lowest in the 11 sample cities (abount 45 percent in 2001). Second, massive
unemployment was also related to the jianyuan zengxiao policy adopted by the SOEs. In the
1990s, the rise of the private sector in China became a phenomenal event (Garnaut, Song,
Yao, and Wang, 2001). In addition, banks began to strengthen their disciplines over SOEs
(Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999). As a result, SOEs began to face both ￿erce competition
from the private sector and a hardened budget constraint imposed by the bank, forcing them
to improve their e￿ciency for the cause of survival. Shaking o￿ redundant workers was thus
a natural choice for SOEs.
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28Table 1. Illustration of DID matching 
Year of  Treatment group  Control group 
Effect T0  T1  T0  T1 
Year of priv.  Year before priv. 
(Y0i) 
Year of priv. (Y01i)A n y  y e a r  ( Y00j)  T0 + 1 (Y01j) 
1
st year after priv.  Year before priv. 
(Y0i) 
1
st year after priv. 
(Y11i) 
Any year (Y10j)  T0 + 2 (Y11j) 
2
nd year after priv.  Year before priv. 
(Y0i) 
2
nd year after priv. 
(Y21i) 
Any year (Y20j)  T0 + 3 (Y21j) 
… … …  …  … 
Notes: T0 is the calendar year before treatment, and T1 is the calendar year after treatment. Y0i is the 
employment growth rate of the ith firm of the treatment group in the year before it was privatized, Yk1i 
is its employment growth rate in the kth year after privatization, and Yk0j and Yk1j are the employment 




























 Profitability  (%)  2702  -1.16  11.84  1624    -2.64   12.00   1078  1.06   11.24  
Labor  Productivity  2702  55.7  82.2  1624    5.00   8.51   1078  6.42   7.68  
Unit Cost (%)  2695  62.75  18.43  1624    64.40    18.55    1071  60.24   17.96  
Investment  Rate  (%)  2695  13.86  37.90  1624    14.85   34.61   1071  12.36   42.37  
Outside  State  Share  (%)  2596  5.45  20.50  1614    3.51   18.18   982  8.64   23.51  
Employment  Conditions                 
Average  Wage  2689  24.2  228.5  1617    2.36   25.43   1072  2.52   18.30  
Redundancy  Rate  (%)  2622  204  809  1583    259   903   1039  119   632  
Capital  per  Worker  2650  235.7  600.6  1597    28.15   68.14   1053  16.63   44.26  
Financial  Conditions                 
Debt/Assets  Ratio  (%)  2320  69.90  68.44  1393    80.74   73.64   927  53.62   56.01  
New  Bank  Dues/Assets  (%)  2607  4.39  81.81  1589    6.02   73.14   1018  1.84   93.73  
New  Tax  Dues/Assets  (%)  2702  1.17  76.59  1624    0.63   23.42   1078  1.99   117.83  
Note: Monetary units are 1,000 Yuan, in 2001 prices 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Sample  Whole Sample  SOE  Privatized Firms 
Variables Obs.  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation






Dependent  Variable                 
     Number  of  on-duty  workers  2691  633.96  943.30  1619    551.50  729.86  1072  758.50  1185.07  








Table 3: Fixed-effect Panel Estimation 
  Average Effect    Dynamic Effect 
  (1) (2)    (3)    (4) 
            
Privatization dummy  17.654***  11.492***         
 (6.53)  (4.14)         
Privatization year          14.188***    9.073*** 
       (4.52)    (3.00) 
First year after privatization        21.241***    14.853*** 
       (5.88)    (3.67) 
Second year after privatization        24.442***    22.682*** 
       (5.55)    (4.79) 
Third year after privatization        26.973***    25.480*** 
       (5.12)    (4.50) 
Fourth year after privatization        27.288***    26.874*** 
       (4.22)    (3.90) 
Fifth year after privatization        23.454***    19.958** 
       (2.92)    (2.40) 
Firm’s performance             
Profitability (%)    0.169*        0.152* 
   (1.88)        (1.69) 
Labor Productivity    -0.301*        -0.268 
   (1.65)        (1.47) 
Unit Cost (%)    0.063        0.060 
   (0.86)        (0.81) 
Investment Rate (%)    0.112        0.114 
   (1.56)        (1.59) 
Outside State Share (%)    0.145*        0.083 
   (1.90)        (1.06) 
Employment Conditions             
Average Wage    -0.130*        -0.121 
   (1.72)        (1.61) 
Redundancy Rate (%)    -0.156        -0.159 
   (0.87)        (0.89) 
Capital per Worker    -0.110***        -0.106*** 


























Table 3: Fixed-effect Panel Estimation (Continued) 
Financial Conditions             
Debt/Assets Ratio (%)    -0.027*        -0.028* 
   (1.75)        (1.80) 
New Bank Dues/Assets (%)    -0.659        -0.689 
   (0.71)        (0.74) 
New Tax Dues/Assets (%)    1.109        1.170 
   (1.04)        (1.10) 
Constant -0.912  0.169*    0.090    -0.956 
 (0.56)  (1.88)    (0.05)    (0.18) 
Observations 2691  2156    2691    2156 
Number of Firms  386  377    386    377 
R-squared 0.09  0.15    0.10    0.16 
Note: The dependent variable is the fixed base growth rate of employment. Column 1 and Column 2presents the 
results for the total and direct average effects of privatization, respectively. And in columns 3 and 4, we report the 
estimated results for the total and direct dynamic effects of privatization, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Results for year dummy variables are not shown.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 4: Logit Estimation of the Propensity Score 
Variables Coefficient  z  ratio 
Firm’s performance    
Profitability (%)  0.013 0.76 
Labor Productivity  0.023 0.89 
Unit Cost (%)  -0.020* 1.81 
Investment Rate (%)  -0.008 1.20 
Outside State Share (%)  0.016 1.54 
Employment Conditions     
Original Number of On-duty Workers  0.0002  0.79 
Average Wage  0.055 1.30 
Redundancy Rate (%)  -0.096 1.17 
Capital per Worker  -0.012 1.34 
(Capital per Worker)
2  0.000 1.54 
Financial Conditions     
Debt/Assets Ratio (%)  0.004  0.58 
(Debt/Assets Ratio)
 2  -0.000013 0.96 
New Bank Dues/Assets (%)  -0.182 0.33 
(New Bank Dues/Assets)
 2  -0.107 0.55 
New Tax Dues/Assets (%)  0.762 1.62 
Constant  -4.341*** 2.87 
Observations  1500 
Number of eid  370 
Log likelihood  -271.7 
Note: As for estimation of propensity score, we only include in the treatment group the firm-year 
observations of privatized firms in the year when they were privatized. And all the firm-year 
observations of firms that remained as pure SOEs until 2001 are in the control group. 
All independent variables are 1 year lagged. Results for industrial, city and year dummy variables are 
not shown.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 Table 5: DID PSM estimation 




# of pure 
SOEs  ATT  Std. err  t value 
          
Privatization  year   124  1,352  1.431   1.783   0.803 
          
First year after privatization  93  1,128  7.888    3.793    2.080 
          
Second year after privatization  70  902  10.212    6.168    1.656 
          
Third year after privatization  52  675  15.742    8.673    1.815 
          
Fourth year after privatization  35  448  19.628    10.746    1.826 
          
Fifth year after privatization  22  221  18.471    10.211    1.809 
                       
Note: Observations of the treatment group (privatized firms) and of the control group (pure SOEs) are 















































































Average private shares SOEs Ratio
 
Note: The left vertical axis represents the average private shares of the new sample and the right 
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